Appendix

Table of Contents

A Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Operationalizations

In this section we describe the data, detail descriptive statistics, operationalizations, and other supporting information. For comprehensive replication materials, see Harvard Dataverse [https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/H2ULQR] , which includes instructions on how to download data sets that must be downloaded from the original data source (e.g., European Social Survey, International Social Survey Programme).

First, we provide additional information on the policy implementation data from Persson and Sundell (2024).[1] In the main text, we describe the data in the section on Data and Methods, and add further clarifications here. To begin, coders examined policy preference questions that had already been asked to respondents in international survey programs, which could be determined as either implemented or not within five years. This means that policy proposals were only included if implementation could be decidedly discerned. Both policies that were already implemented in the country, as well as those requiring a policy change, were included.

In the policy implementation data, the relevant comparison is always between the policy at the time of the survey, and policy five years later. It does not matter what happens between surveys. For example, a policy proposal can be that defense spending should be increased. The comparison is then made between the level of defense spending the year of the survey, as well as the fifth year after. If defense spending was initially decreased in year two and three, but in the fifth year increased to a level above the survey year, then the policy is coded as implemented. In this case the relevant documentation is found in official budgets, but other documents were also consulted to determine implementation status, such as relevant legal documents. Consequently, in some cases no change happened to current policy and there was as such no documentation of the lack of change. As an example of

[1] Additional information is available in their supplementary materials on page 5.

the coding procedure, one question asked respondents whether refugee applicants should be "allowed to work while cases [are] considered." Coders reviewed public legal documents in the countries in question to assess whether this was allowed, and whether there was any change to the policy five years after the policy question was put to respondents.

Second, we detail descriptive statistics and data operationalizations. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models can be found in Table A.1. Since we have collated data from several different sources and operationalizations subsequently differ by survey, we report the operationalizations of our variables separately for each survey in Table A.2, Table A.3, Table A.4, and Table A.5. We also detail the different policy issues (Table A.6), whether they were implemented (Table A.7), and how many policies were evaluated in each country in our dataset (Table A.8). Lastly, we report on the percentage of respondents who said that they demonstrated or voted by country in Table A.9.

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Number of policy questions	292,181	4.087	3.963	1	16
Mean congruence	292,181	0.474	0.348	0	1
Mean support	292,181	0.623	0.356	0	1
Mean implementation	292,181	0.564	0.381	0	1
Income	213,926	0.447	0.300	0	1
University	215,502	0.220	0.414	0	1
Woman	291,852	0.531	0.499	0	1
Age: Under 30	290,703	0.199	0.399	0	1
Age: 30-59	290,703	0.524	0.499	0	1
Age: 60 or more	290,703	0.277	0.448	0	1
Rural	282,827	0.356	0.479	0	1
Ethnic minority	253,926	0.073	0.260	0	1
Left-right self-placement	231,919	3.043	0.914	1	5
Political interest	290,289	0.483	0.500	0	1
Political trust	284,860	0.221	0.415	0	1
Satisfied with democracy	267,701	0.513	0.500	0	1
Political efficacy	89,800	0.299	0.458	0	1
Voted	275,435	0.741	0.438	0	1
Demonstrated	287,035	0.073	0.261	0	1
Contacted politician	262,348	0.130	0.336	0	1
Attended protest meeting	53,556	0.070	0.255	0	1
Signed petition	261,544	0.213	0.410	0	1
Boycotted	260,308	0.156	0.362	0	1
Donated money	90,633	0.162	0.369	0	1
Joined internet forum	53,179	0.041	0.198	0	1
Contacted media	53,561	0.041	0.198	0	1
Worked for political party	208,749	0.042	0.200	0	1
Worked for other organization	200,747	0.135	0.342	0	1
Worn campaign badge	208,539	0.074	0.262	0	1
Ethical consumption	37,079	0.253	0.435	0	1
Illegal protest	37,145	0.011	0.106	0	1
Attended political meeting	24,814	0.171	0.376	0	1

Table A.2: ESS Data - Variables and Operationalizations

Variable	Variable name	Variable description (/question) in dataset	Recoding
Voted	vote	Voted last national election	1 = 1; 2-3 = 0
Demonstrated	pbldmn	Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Worked for political party	wrkprty	Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Worked for other organization	wrkorg	Worked in another organization or association last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Boycotted	bctprd	Boycotted certain products last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Worn campaign badge	badge	Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Signed petition	sgnptit	Signed petition last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Contacted politician	contplt	Contacted politician or government official last 12 months	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Income	hinctnt, hinctnta	Household's total net income, all sources	Recoded by calculating what percentile in the income distribution (in each country) the respondent is located
Tertiary education	eisced	Highest level of education, ES - ISCED	0-5 = 0; 6-7 = 1
Woman	gndr	Gender of respondent	Recoded to: 0 = male; 1 = female
Ethnic minority	blgetmg	Ethnic minority status	Recoded to: 0 = majority group; 1 = minority group
Age	agea	Age of respondent, calculated	Recoded to: <= 30; >= 30, <= 60; >= 60
Rural	domicil	Domicile, respondent's description	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political interest	polintr	How interested in politics	1-2 = 1; 3-4 = 0
Political efficacy	psppsgv, psppsgva	Political system allows people to have a say in what government does	For psppsgv: 0-5 = 0; 6-10 = 1. For psppsgva: 1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political trust	trstplt	Trust in politicians	0-5 = 0; 6-10 = 1
Satisfaction with democracy	stfdem	How satisfied with the way democracy works in country	0-5 = 0; 6-10 = 1
Left-right self-placement	lrscale	Self-placement on the left-right dimension	0-10 scale recoded to: 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6, 3, 3.4, 3.8, 4.2, 4.6, 5

Table A.3: ISSP Citizen I Data - Variables and Operationalizations

Variable	Variable name	Variable description (/question) in dataset	Recoding
Voted	V297	Voted last election	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Demonstrated	V19	Took part in a demonstration	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Boycotted	V18	Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Signed petition	V17	Signed a petition	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Contacted politician	V21	Contacted, or attempt to contact, a politician or a civil servant to express your views	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Joined internet forum	V24	Joined an Internet political forum or discussion group	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Contacted media	V23	Contacted or appeared in the media to express your views	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Income	V254	Respondent's earning	Recoded by calculating what percentile in the income distribution (in each country) the respondent is located
Tertiary education	V205	R: Education II-highest education level	0-4 = 0; 5 = 1
Woman	V200	Sex of respondent	Recoded to: 0 = male; 1 = female
Ethnic minority	V379	Ethnic minority status	Recoded to: 0 = part of ethnic majority (within country); 1 = part of an ethnic minority group (within country)
Age	V201	Age of respondent	Recoded to: <30; >= 30, <60; >= 60
Rural	V378	Urban/rural - Type of residence: R's self assessment	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political interest	V42	How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	1-2 = 1; 3-4 = 0
Political efficacy	V36	People like me don't have any say about what the government does	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political trust	V43	Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right	1-2 = 1; 3-5 = 0
Satisfaction with democracy	V60	How well does democracy work in (COUNTRY) today?	0-5 = 0; 6-10 = 1
Left-right self-placement	V258	Left-right placement derived from party affiliation	No recoding. 1-5

Table A.4: ISSP Citizen II Data - Variables and Operationalizations

Variable	Variable name	Variable description (/question) in dataset	Recoding
Voted	VOTE _ LE	Did respondent vote in last general election	1 = 1; 2 = 0
Demonstrated	V19	Took part in a demonstration (any kind of demonstration)	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Boycotted	V18	Boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Signed petition	V17	Signed a petition	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Contacted politician	V21	Contacted, or attempt to contact, a politician or a civil servant to express your views	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Joined internet forum	V24	Joined an Internet political forum or discussion group	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Contacted media	V23	Contacted or appeared in the media to express your views	1 = 1; 2-4 = 0
Income	Country-specific variable names	Country specific personal income	Combining income variables. Recoded to respondent's percentile in the income distribution (in each country)
Tertiary education	DEGREE	Comparative: Highest completed degree of education	0-4 = 0; 5-6 = 1
Woman	SEX	Sex	Recoded to: 0 = man; 1 = woman
Ethnic minority	Country-specific variable names	Ethnic minority status	Combining ethnicity variables. Recoded to: 0 = ethnic majority (within country); 1 = ethnic minority (within country)
Age	AGE	Age of respondent	Recoded to: <30; >= 30, <60; >= 60
Rural	URBRURAL	Would you describe the place where you live as...	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political interest	V47	How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	1-2 = 1; 3-4 = 0
Political efficacy	V41	People like me don't have any say about what the government does	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political trust	V49	Most of the time we can trust people in government to do what is right	1-2 = 1; 3-5 = 0
Satisfaction with democracy	V62	How well does democracy work in (COUNTRY) today?	0-5 = 0; 6-10 = 1
Left-right self-placement	V48	Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?	0-10 scale recoded to: 1, 1.4, 1.8, 2.2, 2.6, 3, 3.4, 3.8, 4.2, 4.6, 5

Table A.5: ISSP Role of Government III Data - Variables and Operationalizations

Variable	Variable name	Variable description (/question) in dataset	Recoding
Voted	Variables v249-v271	Last vote II	Recoded to 1 if they voted for any party, 0 if they did not vote
Demonstrated	v11	Gone on a protest march or demonstration	1 = 1; 2-3 = 0
Attended protest meeting	v10	Attended a public meeting organised to protest against the government	1 = 1; 2-3 = 0
Income	v217	Respondent's earnings I	Calculating respondent's percentile in the income distribution (in each country)
Tertiary education	v205	Education II: Categories	0-4 = 0; 5 = 1
Woman	v200	Sex of Respondent	Recoded to: 0 = man; 1 = woman
Ethnic minority	v324	Ethnic minority status	Recoded to: 0 = part of ethnic majority (within country); 1 = part of an ethnic minority group (within country)
Age	v201	Age of Respondent	Recoded to: <30; >= 30, <60; >= 60
Rural	v275	Urban/rural	1-2 = 0; 3 = 1
Political interest	v46	How interested would you say you personally are in politics?	1-3 = 1; 4-5 = 0
Political efficacy	v47	People like me don't have any say about what the government does	1-3 = 0; 4-5 = 1
Political trust	v53	People we elect as (MPs) try to keep the promises they have made during the election	1-2 = 1; 3-5 = 0
Satisfaction with democracy	v55	All in all, how well or badly do you think th system of democracy in (R's country) works these days?	1-2 = 1; 3-4 = 0
Left-right self-placement	V223	Left-right placement derived from party affiliation in most countries, see codebook	No recoding. 1-5

Table A.6: Policy Issues - Data Set for Analyses of Vote and Demonstrate in the Manuscript

Category	Policy Issue	Survey
Civil Liberties	Ban antidemocratic parties	ESS
Civil Liberties	Keep suspected terrorists in prison	ESS
Civil Liberties	Allow racists to hold meetings	ISSP Citizen
Civil Liberties	Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings	ISSP Citizen
Civil Liberties	Allow religious extremists to hold meetings	ISSP Citizen
Civil Liberties	Long-term resident non-citizens can vote	ISSP Citizen
Civil Liberties	Citizens have right to NOT vote	ISSP Citizen
Economic issues	Cuts in government spending	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Public funding of job creation programs	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Reduce working week	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Mainly private ownership of banks	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Mainly private ownership of hospitals	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Law control wages	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on health	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase old-age pensions	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase unemployment benefits	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on defense	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Less government regulation of business	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Mainly private ownership of electricity	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on education	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on environment	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on arts	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Increase public expenditure on police	ISSP RoG
Economic issues	Sick leave for caring for family	ESS
Economic issues	Higher earners get higher pensions	ESS
Economic issues	Higher earners better unemployment benefits	ESS
Economic issues	Support basic income scheme	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Immigrants made to leave for any crime	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Refugees allowed to bring family	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Ethnic hatred law	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Support immigrant applicants financially	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Refugee applicants allowed to work	ESS
Immigration/Ethnicity	Immigrants made to leave for unemployment	ESS

Table A.7: Policy Implementation Within a Five-Year Period

Policy	Not Implemented	Implemented
Allow racists to hold meetings	9	29
Allow religious extremists to hold meetings	5	31
Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings	1	43
Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish	10	5
Ban antidemocratic parties	73	60
Citizens have right to NOT vote	1	10
Cuts in government spending	7	12
Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law	0	24
Ethnic hatred law	3	17
Higher earners better unemployment benefits	4	14
Higher earners get higher pensions	0	15
Refugee applicants allowed to work	10	9
Immigrants made to leave for any crime	16	2
Immigrants made to leave for unemployment	14	4
Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime	2	17
Increase old-age pensions	9	8
Increase public expenditure on arts	5	9
Increase public expenditure on defense	14	5
Increase public expenditure on education	8	10
Increase public expenditure on environment	6	8
Increase public expenditure on health	5	14
Increase public expenditure on police	7	9
Increase unemployment benefits	13	6
Keep suspected terrorists in prison	32	5
Law control wages	6	13
Less government regulation of business	14	1
Long-term resident non-citizens can vote	9	2
Mainly private ownership of banks	1	15
Mainly private ownership of electricity	9	6
Mainly private ownership of hospitals	15	3
Public funding of job creation programs	0	12
Reduce working week	10	4
Refugees allowed to bring family	1	18
Sick leave for caring for family	15	10
Support basic income scheme	1	0
Support immigrant applicants financially	3	16

Table A.8: Number of Evaluated Policies by Country

Country	Number of Evaluated Policies
AT	28
AU	24
BE	34
BG	27
CA	19
CH	42
CL	3
CY	27
CZ	48
DE	50
DK	27
EE	16
ES	50
FI	34
FR	50
GB	50
GR	17
HR	11
HU	44
IE	45
IL	47
IS	12
IT	32
JP	24
KR	3
LT	13
LU	11
LV	24
MX	3
NL	34
NO	50
NZ	19
PL	50
PT	29
RO	5
SE	50
SI	50
SK	17
TR	11
US	24

Note: The same policy can be asked in two different surveys, and are in such cases counted twice in this table.

Table A.9: Percentage Reported Demonstrators and Voters by Country

Country	Demonstrators %	Voters %
AT	7	77
AU	12	97
BE	7	82
BG	6	72
CA	14	86
CH	7	56
CL	3	73
CY	9	86
CZ	4	61
DE	5	84
DK	7	88
EE	2	56
ES	23	76
FI	2	76
FR	18	70
GB	4	69
GR	7	81
HR	8	75
HU	3	75
IE	7	75
IL	10	78
IS	16	87
IT	17	89
JP	2	72
KR	7	82
LT	3	60
LU	18	61
LV	6	58
MX	7	65
NL	4	84
NO	9	81
NZ	12	91
PL	2	66
PT	4	70
RO	4	67
SE	7	85
SI	4	71
SK	2	73
TR	4	77
US	9	NA

Note: Data are not available in our harmonized dataset on whether individuals voted in the United States.

B Further Analysis of Voting and Demonstrating

In this section we analyze voting and demonstrating further, complementing the main analysis in the manuscript. First, in Table B.1 we document confidence intervals of the difference between the weighted means found in Table 1.

Table B.1: Confidence Intervals of Difference Between Bootstrapped Means.

Difference Between Means in Table 1	Difference with Confidence Intervals in Brackets (95%)
Voters - Nonvoters	-0.015 (-0.017, -0.013)
Demonstrators - Non-demonstrators	0.027 (0.024, 0.030)
High-income - Low-income	0.021 (0.017, 0.025)

Note: The mean difference is calculated by bootstrapping the weighted mean difference between the two groups 400 times.

Second, in the main analysis we find that demonstrating is associated with more congruence compared to voting. However, it may be the case that those who demonstrate and get their preferred policies also vote. Such individuals may be understood as "intense policy-demanders," and they may have the highest opinion-policy congruence of all groups. To investigate this, we include an interaction of the two variables voted and demonstrated in Table B.2. The results show that congruence for someone who reported to have voted and demonstrated (the coefficient for voted, demonstrated, and the interaction effect added together) is the same as for someone who only demonstrated since the interaction and voting coefficients cancel each other out in the final model (Model 3). This analysis indicates that there is no added congruence for those who are active in both types of participation according to our data.

However, we add an important note of caution to this interpretation, as the group that demonstrates but does not vote is very small (n=4,155 compared to the full sample of this analysis of 147,108). A robust test of these expectations would require a research design planned to properly analyze heterogeneous subgroups that would be expected to belong to this "demonstrators who do not vote" group, including young people who were not yet

eligible to vote at the time relevant for reporting, as well as immigrants or others who do not have the right to vote. Additional research is therefore needed with research designs tailored to further investigate the distinction in congruence between those who only demonstrate versus those who demonstrate and vote.

Table B.2: Explaining Opinion-Policy Congruence - Introducing an Interaction Effect Between Voted and Demonstrated

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted	0.005**	0.005**	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Demonstrated	0.022**	0.025**	0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Voted × Demonstrated		-0.004	-0.004
		(0.005)	(0.005)
Income			0.013**
			(0.002)
Tertiary education			0.034**
			(0.001)
Woman			−0.005**
			(0.001)
Age < 30			0.005**
			(0.002)
Age >= 60			−0.012**
			(0.001)
Rural			−0.008**
			(0.001)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	147,108	147,108	147,108
R^2	0.386	0.386	0.390

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is opinion-policy congruence. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. When we re-estimate Model 1 with the same sample as in Model 4, the coefficient for voting is 0.004** and 0.022** for Demonstrated.

C Analyzing Additional Forms of Participation

In this section we examine whether forms of participation in addition to those analyzed in the article are associated with opinion-policy congruence, and whether controlling for multiple types of political behavior meaningfully changes our main results. We run several analyses listed below.

First, we investigate the association between different forms of participation and opinion-policy congruence one by one. As discussed in the article, Figure 6 displays coefficients for forms of participation for which we have indicators that are harmonizable across survey programs, and are included in multiple survey waves. In Figure C.1 we conduct the same analysis but for other forms of participation that cannot be harmonized across surveys and are not included in multiple survey waves. This means that the number of observations for each of these regression analyses is relatively small, and the same is true for the number of policy questions that create the opinion-policy congruence scores. Keeping these issues in mind, it is clear that the results in Figure C.1 show that almost all forms of nonelectoral participation are positively associated with opinion-policy congruence. Furthermore, they have very similar associations with opinion-policy congruence as demonstrating. Except for ethical consumption, the coefficient denoted by an x (estimating the regression coefficient for demonstrating, using the same sample as for the specific participation variable) is of a similar size to the estimated regression coefficient for each participation type.

As mentioned, each of these additional participation types are estimated with fewer policy questions than our main variables (demonstrating and voting). We therefore report on the exact policy questions that we evaluate for each participation type in Table C.2 and Table C.3. Furthermore, Figure 6 in the main text and Figure C.1 in this appendix do not include the exact coefficient sizes, standard errors, and R^2. Table C.1 displays these parameters.

Next we examine whether the association between demonstrating and opinion-policy congruence is driven by correlations with multiple forms of participation. We therefore conduct

additional analyses in which indicators for multiple forms of participation are included in the same model. The results are presented in Table C.4, with forms of participation grouped according to data availability, as we pool data from several different surveys. We include all forms of participation except for donating money, because this variable leads to a substantial drop in the number of observations. All three models include the same socio-economic control variables as in Model 4 of Table 3, as well as country-survey-year fixed effects. Almost all of the nonelectoral forms of participation have positive associations with congruence, although the association is not always statistically significant.

We are also interested in whether individuals who are active in several of the participation activities have better opinion-policy congruence compared to those who have done fewer or none. We therefore re-estimate Table 3 with a variable that is an index. The index is the share of nonelectoral participation activities that the respondent was asked about, and which they reported having done. This index has the value 1 if the individual has done all of the activities (see Table C.2 for the full list, which clarifies that the available variables differ by data set), and 0 if they have done none. Table C.5 shows that the coefficient for Nonelectoral Participation Experience is larger than the coefficient for Demonstrated reported in Table 3.

Figure C.1: Association Between Different Forms of Political Participation and Opinion-Policy Congruence.



Note: Circles represent models with socio-economic control variables (income, education, gender, age, rural), while squares indicate models without control variables. An x represents a regression model with control variables, where demonstrating is the only included participation variable, but is estimated with the same sample as that which we estimate the coefficient for that participation variable. The sample sizes (n) reflect the models with control variables. All coefficient estimates are based on separate regressions. 95 percent confidence intervals. See Table C.1 for additional model specification information.

Table C.1: Model Parameters for Figure 6 and Figure C.1.

Variable name	With controls?	Coefficient	SE	n	R^2
Attended protest meeting	No	0.043	0.005	52,881	0.316
	Yes	0.037	0.005	40,759	0.328
Participated in boycott	No	0.036	0.002	259,467	0.331
	Yes	0.029	0.002	142,162	0.32
Contacted a politician	No	0.018	0.002	261,189	0.331
	Yes	0.014	0.002	143,380	0.321
Contacted media	No	0.045	0.006	52,805	0.317
	Yes	0.034	0.006	40,727	0.328
Donated money	No	0.028	0.002	89,764	0.459
	Yes	0.022	0.003	55,073	0.439
Ethical consumption	No	0.054	0.002	37,022	0.253
	Yes	0.037	0.003	14,448	0.261
Illegal protest	No	0.011	0.008	37,078	0.238
	Yes	-0.012	0.012	14,461	0.253
Joined internet forum	No	0.07	0.006	52,413	0.319
	Yes	0.048	0.006	40,418	0.33
Attended political meeting	No	-0.004	0.002	24,543	0.3
	Yes	-0.004	0.003	9,129	0.397
Worked for other organization	No	0.018	0.002	200,533	0.296
	Yes	0.011	0.003	96,420	0.281
Signed petition	No	0.028	0.001	260,501	0.331
	Yes	0.02	0.002	142,934	0.321
Worked for political party	No	0.021	0.003	208,473	0.292
	Yes	0.017	0.005	102,681	0.277
Demonstrated	No	0.028	0.002	287,035	0.336
	Yes	0.02	0.003	153,338	0.327
Voted	No	0.002	0.001	273,191	0.33
	Yes	0.004	0.002	147,108	0.32
Worn a badge	No	0.022	0.003	208,347	0.292
	Yes	0.017	0.004	102,636	0.277

Table C.2: Policy Questions for Each Participation Variable in Figure 6 and Figure C.1.

Variable name	Surveys	Policy Questions
Attended protest meeting	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote
Participated in boycott	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II, ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote; Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugeee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment
Contacted a politician	ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment
Contacted media	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote
Donated money	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II, ESS (round 1)	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment; Ban antidemocratic parties
Ethical consumption	ESS (round 1)	Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment; Ban antidemocratic parties
Illegal protest	ESS (round 1)	Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment; Ban antidemocratic parties

Table C.3: Table C.2 - Continued.

Variable name	Surveys	Policy Questions
Joined internet forum	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote
Attended political meeting	ISSP RoG	Cuts in government spending; Public funding of job creation programs; Reduce working week; Mainly private ownership of banks; Mainly private ownership of hospitals; Law control wages; Increase public expenditure on health; Increase old-age pensions; Increase unemployment benefits; Increase public expenditure on defense; Less government regulation of business; Mainly private ownership of electricity; Increase public expenditure on education; Increase public expenditure on environment; Increase public expenditure on arts; Increase public expenditure on police
Worked for other organization	ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment
Signed petition	ISSP Citizen I, ISSP Citizen II, ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Allow racists to hold meetings; Allow religious extremists to hold meetings; Allow revolutionaries to hold meetings; Citizens have right to NOT vote; Long-term resident non-citizens can vote; Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment
Worked for political party	ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment
Worn a badge	ESS (round 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8)	Ban antidemocratic parties; Keep suspected terrorists in prison; Sick leave for caring for family; Higher earners get higher pensions; Higher earners better unemployment benefits; Support basic income scheme; Ethnic discrimination in the workplace law; Immigrants made to leave for any crime; Immigrants made to leaver for serious crime; Refugees allowed to bring family; Ethnic hatred law; Allow separate schools for immigrants if they wish; Support immigrant applicants financially; Refugee applicants allowed to work; Immigrants made to leave for unemployment

Table C.4: Multiple Forms of Nonelectoral Participation are Positively Associated With Opinion-Policy Congruence.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted	0.002	0.003	-0.011^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Demonstrated	0.010^{**}	0.001	0.026^{**}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Contacted politician	0.003	-0.003	0.010
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Signed petition	0.012^{**}	0.012^{**}	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Boycotted	0.023^{**}	0.021^{**}	0.026^{**}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Worked in political party		0.003	
		(0.004)	
Worked in other organization		0.010^{**}	
		(0.002)	
Worn campaign badge		0.004	
		(0.003)	
Joined internet forum			0.018^{**}
			(0.007)
Contacted media			0.012
			(0.007)
Control variables	✓	✓	✓
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	136,817	94,942	34,744
R^2	0.377	0.330	0.329

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is opinion-policy congruence. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. Control variables are the same as in Model 4 of Table 3.

Table C.5: Re-estimating Table 3 With an Independent Variable Denoting Mean Nonelectoral Participation Experience.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voted	-0.0003	-0.001	-0.0001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Nonelectoral	0.051**	0.054**	0.034**	0.040**
Participation Experience	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Income		0.031**		0.012**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Tertiary education			0.031**	0.032**
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Woman				−0.005**
				(0.001)
Age < 30				0.005**
				(0.002)
Age >= 60				−0.012**
				(0.001)
Rural				−0.007**
				(0.001)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	274,772	201,725	201,636	148,058
R^2	0.393	0.403	0.385	0.391

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is opinion-policy congruence. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. When we re-estimate Model 1 with the same sample as in Model 4, the coefficient for Voted is 0.002 while the coefficient for Nonelectoral Participation Experience is 0.055**.

D Alternative Model Specifications

In this section, we report on alternative model specifications to our main regression models. To begin, Table D.1 displays Table 4 in full,[2] instead of the shortened version found in the main text.[3]

Next, we exclude the data from the ISSP Role of Government as a robustness test, due to the unusual question wording used in this survey for demonstrating compared to other surveys in our dataset. That is, the ISSP Role of Government survey asks whether the respondent had demonstrated in the past five years (in contrast to the common question wording of in the past 12 months). Table D.2 displays the findings of these analyses (Models 1 and 2), and they are generally similar to the main models reported in the article.

The exclusion of the ISSP RoG survey also allows us to include an additional theoretically relevant socio-economic control variable to our analysis, namely whether the respondent belonged to an ethnic minority (Model 3). The results show that this variable is not a statistically significant covariate, and the findings are generally similar when accounting for ethnic minority status.

We finally evaluate another alternative model specification. Table D.3 shows the same analysis that is displayed in Table 3, but where we have also included a variable measuring left-right self-placement. The results are largely the same.

[2]Model 1 is excluded, and therefore, models 1-5 in Table D.1 correspond to models 2-6 in Table 4.
[3]The regression models do not suffer from any significant multicollinearity.

Table D.1: Full Table 4 - Attitudinal Engagement Does Not Explain the Difference Between Demonstrators and Non-Demonstrators.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Voted	0.001	0.003*	0.003*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Demonstrated	0.013**	0.015**	0.015**	0.017**	0.015**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political interest	0.014**				0.009**
	(0.001)				(0.002)
Political trust		0.007**			-0.004
		(0.001)			(0.002)
Satisfied with democracy			0.009**		0.001
			(0.001)		(0.002)
Political efficacy				0.007**	0.006**
				(0.002)	(0.003)
Income	0.012**	0.013**	0.012**	0.008*	0.008*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Tertiary education	0.032**	0.034**	0.034**	0.017**	0.017**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Woman	−0.004**	−0.005**	−0.005**	−0.006**	−0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age < 30	0.006**	0.005**	0.004*	0.012**	0.012**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age >= 60	−0.013**	−0.013**	−0.013**	−0.006**	−0.008**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural	−0.007**	−0.008**	−0.007**	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	146,351	144,412	136,379	50,524	45,642
R^2	0.391	0.389	0.392	0.451	0.447

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. Socio-economic control variables include income, tertiary education, woman, age, and rural. When we re-estimate Model 1-4 with the same sample (number of observations) as in Model 5, the coefficients for Voted are (from Model 1 to Model 4) -0.002, -0.0004, -0.001, and -0.001. For Demonstrated, the coefficients are 0.015**, 0.016**, 0.016**, and 0.016**.

Table D.2: Robustness Tests: Omitting ISSP Role of Government 1996, Including Ethnic Minority Status.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted	0.005**	0.004**	0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Demonstrated	0.031**	0.021**	0.017**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income		0.013**	0.015**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Tertiary education		0.043**	0.041**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Woman		−0.006**	−0.005**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Age < 30		0.009**	0.006**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Age >= 60		−0.016**	−0.016**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural		−0.008**	−0.009**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Ethnic minority			0.006*
			(0.003)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	140,014	140,014	126,353
R^2	0.370	0.376	0.359

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent.

Table D.3: Controlling for Left-Right Self-Placement.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted	0.004*	0.003	0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Demonstrated	0.024**	0.016**	0.013**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income		0.014**	0.016**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Tertiary education		0.038**	0.037**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Woman		−0.006**	−0.006**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Age < 30		0.005*	0.005**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Age >= 60		−0.015**	−0.014**
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Rural		−0.008**	−0.008**
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Left-right self-placement			−0.009**
			(0.001)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	123,954	123,954	123,954
R^2	0.369	0.375	0.376

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent.

E Issue-Specific Regressions and Group-Policy Level Analysis

In this section we have divided the policies in our dataset into three issue categories: economic policy, immigration/ethnic minority policy, and policies concerning civil liberties. The first three tables, Table E.1, Table E.2, and Table E.3, show the findings when examining the data at the individual level. The results show that the positive relationship between demonstrating and opinion-policy congruence is mainly driven by policy issues relating to civil liberties and immigration/ethnic minority policy, and less so by economic policies.

It is common in the literature on opinion-policy congruence to examine the views of different groups (such as different income groups) as a whole, rather than at the individual level. That means that researchers examine whether the average opinion within a group on a policy in a country is correlated with subsequent policy implementation. As a robustness test we run the same analysis for demonstrators compared to non-demonstrators, but the independent variable is specified as the proportion in favor of the policy in each group, and the dependent variable is whether the policy was implemented or not. Table E.4, Table E.5, and Table E.6 show the results for the data when analyzed at the group-policy level, and the results are similar to the individual-level analyses in Table E.1, Table E.2, and Table E.3.

The final table, Table E.7, shows the results for the group-policy level analysis when combining all categories. The results are consistent with those found in Table 1, and are similar to other comparisons in the field.

Table E.1: Individual-Level Regression - Civil Liberty Policy

	(1)	(2)
Voted	-0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Demonstrated	0.040**	0.030**
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income		0.002
		(0.003)
Tertiary education		0.040**
		(0.002)
Woman		−0.013**
		(0.002)
Age < 30		0.017**
		(0.002)
Age >= 60		−0.018**
		(0.002)
Rural		−0.006**
		(0.002)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓
N	132,962	132,962
R^2	0.306	0.310

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent.

Table E.2: Individual-Level Regression - Economic Issues

	(1)	(2)
Voted	0.008**	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Demonstrated	0.003	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income		0.028**
		(0.004)
Tertiary education		0.016**
		(0.002)
Woman		0.002
		(0.002)
Age $<$ 30		-0.002
		(0.002)
Age $>=$ 60		-0.0001
		(0.002)
Rural		-0.001
		(0.002)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓
N	30,565	30,565
R^2	0.446	0.449

Note: *p $<$ .05; **p $<$ .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent.

Table E.3: Individual-Level Regression - Immigration and Ethnic Minority Policy

	(1)	(2)
Voted	0.013**	0.008*
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Demonstrated	0.026**	0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income		0.021**
		(0.005)
Tertiary education		0.056**
		(0.004)
Woman		0.002
		(0.003)
Age $<$ 30		-0.003
		(0.003)
Age $>=$ 60		-0.017^{**}
		(0.003)
Rural		-0.013^{**}
		(0.003)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓
N	17,717	17,717
R^2	0.158	0.178

Note: *p $<$ .05; **p $<$ .01. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent.

Table E.4: Demonstrating and Opinion-Policy Congruence - Civil Liberty Policy

	Implementation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Demonstrator Support	-0.63**		0.94**
	(0.11)		(0.35)
Non-Demonstrator Support		-0.63**	-1.38**
		(0.09)	(0.30)
Constant	1.16**	1.17**	1.10**
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	278	278	278
R^2	0.46	0.49	0.50
Adjusted R^2	0.37	0.41	0.42

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table E.5: Demonstrating and Opinion-Policy Congruence - Economic Issues

	Implementation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Demonstrator Support	0.62**		0.61
	(0.12)		(0.45)
Non-Demonstrator Support		0.60**	0.01
		(0.12)	(0.44)
Constant	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	324	324	324
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.10	0.09	0.10

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table E.6: Demonstrating and Opinion-Policy Congruence - Immigration and Ethnic Minority Policy

	Implementation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Demonstrator Support	1.38**		1.82**
	(0.16)		(0.27)
Non-Demonstrator Support		1.04**	−0.64*
		(0.21)	(0.31)
Constant	-0.24	0.01	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	171	171	171
R^2	0.37	0.20	0.39
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.08	0.30

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table E.7: Demonstrating and Opinion-Policy Congruence

	Implementation					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Demonstrator	0.16*		1.66**	0.24**		1.66**
Support	(0.07)		(0.20)	(0.08)		(0.20)
Non-Demonstrator		−0.04	−1.49**		0.02	−1.45**
Support		(0.07)	(0.19)		(0.07)	(0.19)
Constant	0.48**	0.61**	0.49**	0.61**	0.74**	0.61**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Country FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	775	775	775	775	775	775
R^2	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.16
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.16

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01.

F Differences in Policy Support

Figure F.1 and Figure F.2 show differences in policy support between the different groups. The figures show how far each group's preference is from one another, centered around 0. It is clear that differences are larger between demonstrators and non-demonstrators, compared to voters and nonvoters.

Figure F.1: Difference in Policy Support Between Voters and Nonvoters.



Figure F.2: Difference in Policy Support Between Demonstrators and Non-Demonstrators.



G Robustness Tests - Don't Knows and NAs as Incongruent, and Removing Indifferent Responses

In the main analysis we remove both don't know answers and non-answers, as it is unclear whether these responses are congruent or not. We also include indifferent answers in our main analysis, coding such answers as 0.5 congruent. However, excluding don't know answers, and including indifferent responses as "half congruent," are methodological choices that may skew the results if some groups are more indifferent or answer don't know more often. For example, while there is no difference between demonstrators and non-demonstrators in how many of their answers to policy questions were indifferent (16.5% of all answers for both groups), voters were less likely to give indifferent answers compared to nonvoters (15.5% compared to 18%). We therefore conduct two robustness checks.

First, we code don't know answers and non-answers as not congruent, since it can be argued that these individuals cannot be congruent if they do not have an opinion, or if they did not answer the question. Table G.1 and Table G.2 display the results with this coding procedure, and the results are very similar to those reported in Table 1 and Table 3.

Second, we remove indifferent answers and redo the analysis. Table G.3 and Table G.4 show that when we implement this robustness test, the results are very similar to those reported in the main text.

Table G.1: Replicating Table 1 – Including Don't Know and Non-Answers

	Unweighted mean congruence	*Weighted mean congruence*	*Mean number of questions*	*n*
Voters	0.460 (0.458, 0.461)	0.505 (0.503, 0.506)	4.00	209,006
Nonvoters	0.477 (0.474, 0.480)	0.513 (0.511, 0.516)	3.65	75,223
Demonstrators	0.503 (0.499, 0.508)	0.538 (0.535, 0.541)	5.47	21,229
Non-demonstrators	0.461 (0.460, 0.463)	0.506 (0.505, 0.507)	4.01	274,644
High-income	0.478 (0.475, 0.482)	0.522 (0.520, 0.525)	4.14	32,616
Low-income	0.437 (0.434, 0.439)	0.494 (0.492, 0.496)	4.07	57,270

Note: Mean value in second column weighted by number of policy questions answered by each respondent. 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

Table G.2: Replicating Table 3 – Including Don't Know and Non-Answers.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voted	0.005**	0.003*	0.004	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Demonstrated	0.026**	0.025**	0.017**	0.015**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income		0.043**		0.018**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Tertiary education			0.035**	0.034**
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Woman				−0.007**
				(0.001)
Age < 30				0.006**
				(0.002)
Age >= 60				−0.016**
				(0.001)
Rural				−0.009**
				(0.001)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	281,685	205,796	207,385	151,355
R^2	0.349	0.372	0.350	0.367

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is opinion-policy congruence. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. When we re-estimate Model 1 with the same sample as in Model 4, the coefficient for Voted is 0.007** and 0.023** for Demonstrated.

Table G.3: Replicating Table 1 Without Indifferent Responses

	Unweighted mean congruence	*Weighted mean congruence*	*Mean number of questions*	*n*
Voters	0.467 (0.465, 0.469)	0.521 (0.520, 0.522)	4.08	191,993
Nonvoters	0.490 (0.487, 0.493)	0.537 (0.535, 0.540)	3.57	64,463
Demonstrators	0.514 (0.509, 0.519)	0.556 (0.552, 0.559)	5.53	20,082
Non-demonstrators	0.470 (0.469, 0.472)	0.526 (0.524, 0.527)	4.11	247,822
High-income	0.484 (0.480, 0.488)	0.536 (0.533, 0.540)	4.18	30,733
Low-income	0.443 (0.440, 0.446)	0.512 (0.509, 0.515)	4.15	50,601

Note: Mean value in second column weighted by number of policy questions answered by each respondent. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. The difference between groups within each category is significant in all cases, and the same is true for demonstrators and nonvoters (who have the highest average congruence scores).

Table G.4: Replicating Table 3 Without Indifferent Responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voted	0.003*	0.002	0.001	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Demonstrated	0.025**	0.026**	0.015**	0.015**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income		0.040**		0.017**
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Tertiary education			0.038**	0.039**
			(0.001)	(0.002)
Woman				−0.006**
				(0.001)
Age < 30				0.005**
				(0.002)
Age >= 60				−0.013**
				(0.002)
Rural				−0.008**
				(0.001)
Country-Survey-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	254,307	187,465	185,150	136,658
R^2	0.396	0.409	0.384	0.395

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is opinion-policy congruence. Observations weighted by the number of policy questions answered by each respondent. When we re-estimate Model 1 with the same sample as in Model 4, the coefficient for Voted is 0.006** and 0.023** for Demonstrated.